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Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, ed
2011. Heidi E. Grasswick. Springer, Dordrecht; New York, 268 p., index, price for
hardcover copy $ 189.00
Reviewed by Susanne Pohlmann 1
This anthology is a collection of 12 essays on various topics of feminist
epistemology and philosophy of science. The articles are grouped into three different
parts. The first part is titled 'Intersections: Feminism, Epistemology, and Science Studies'
and combines five very diverse approaches to the field. The first article of Phyllis Rooney
is a meta-epistemological analysis of the precarious position of feminist epistemology
within the general discipline. According to Rooney, feminist epistemology is still
marginalized as 'epistemology not proper’ despite numerous thematic intersections with
other epistemological strands such as social epistemology, pragmatism and virtue
epistemology. Mechanisms of exclusion and demarcation cause a dichotomy that ignores
both, the variety of feminist epistemological approaches and the diversity of mainstream
epistemology. The perpetuation of this false dichotomy reveals philosophy’s history of
sexism and racism where women and non-whites are not capable of philosophical
inquiry.
How feminist epistemology, actually, is engaged in critical debate with other
epistemological strands is exemplified by Kristina Rolin. Rolin takes up non-feminist
criticism of Helen Longino's concept of critical contextual empiricism. This criticism
refers to methodological dogmatism, lack of empirical evidence that inquiry conducted in
the framework of contextual empiricism is conducive to scientific success, and relativism
with regard to moral and social values. In her counterarguments, Rolin draws on the
concept of a default and challenge structure of epistemic justification which holds that
epistemic claims are to be adopted with a defense commitment. She combines this
concept with an adherence to the four norms of Longino's contextual empiricism, namely
public venues, uptake of criticism, public standards and tempered equality of intellectual
authority. Adherence to these norms, Rolin argues, not only avoids dogmatism and
relativism but also guarantees a degree of responsibility that justifies scientific practices
beyond their conduciveness to scientific success.
Whereas Rolin's contribution is a defense of feminist values with regard to
scientific practices, Daukas' argumentation centers on the question how to reconcile and
advance the two core concepts of feminist epistemology, namely feminist standpoint
theory and contextual empiricism. Daukas combines contextual communal knowing with
the epistemically privileged position of the marginalized to develop her key concept:
epistemic trustworthiness as oppositional agency against those epistemic practices that
dismiss the testimony of marginalized people.
The fourth essay by Samantha Frost draws on the research of feminist new
materialism on the agency of matter and biology to generate new epistemological
insights. Feminist new materialism challenges the concept of the constructedness of
nature. It understands nature and culture as co-constructed by multiply interdependent
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processes. According to Frost, our main problem with properly understanding this
interdependency is a flawed concept of causation that casts the relations of cause and
effect in simple linear terms whereas, actually, these relations are complex, recursive and
multi-linear.
Frost's essay contributes to relaunching a debate that - due to essentialist
misconceptions - has long been a minefield for feminist inquiry. Similarly thought
provoking is Sandra Harding's analysis of the analogy of dichotomies like male/female,
public/private and tradition/modernity. According to Harding, gender stereotypes of male
public life and female domesticity together with the exclusive application of modern
science and technology on public activities established a gendered hierarchy between
tradition and modernity. Harding's main argument is that the domestic realm is not per se
a field of marginalization but that the application of modern science and technology
should be reconnected and associated with domesticity. Harding, thus, combines gender
analysis with a critical stance towards science. She calls for a re-conceptualization of
science and its harnessing for modern lives beyond gendered and/or social conflicts.
Part II is titled 'Democracy and Diversity in Knowledge Practices'. It consists of
three articles. Kristen Intemann's article explores the risks and advantages of those
scientific practices that adhere to the value of diversity and equality of background
assumptions. Her central argument is that value-neutrality does not meet feminist
scientific needs because it does not allow value judgments against sexist science,
criticism of sexist science on the ground of values and value judgments in favor of
feminist goals. Instead, Intemann argues, scientific practices should be subjected to social
and ethical values in accordance with feminist goals. Her claim is that these values will
also improve the epistemic results of scientific inquiry.
The other two articles take another direction of analysis. They investigate the
concept of diversity in academia and its impact on representation and employment equity
of marginalized groups. Carla Fehr introduces the distinction of 'diversity free riding'
versus 'diversity development work'. 'Diversity free riding' is a form of exploiting the
additional insights of diversity workers without granting them the benefits of inclusion,
whereas 'diversity development work' is the credible effort to nurture a culture where
dissenting perspectives can be explored and developed. Fehr goes on to analyze the
cultural factors that may block epistemic diversity with respect to gender such as biased
hiring and promotion decisions that prevent women's dissent from getting uptake,
isolation or exclusion from networking opportunities that inhibit women to offer dissent
and the positioning at low ranks or in solo or minority status where faculty tend to adopt
an extra high measure of conformity.
Alison Wylie, in her discussion of diversity and representation, draws on feminist
standpoint theory. Equally to Fehr, Wylie is concerned with the ongoing marginalization
of women in academia in the post civil rights era. Privileged insights, she argues, not only
offer an understanding of the patterns of epistemic injustice. They also have an impact on
hermeneutic resources due to scientific conventions that ban privileged insights by
framing them as idiosyncrasy. This circumstance has been so far not properly
acknowledged by equity activists. Thus, research on workplace environment can also
refine standpoint theory by calling into action a more critical analysis of these
conventions.
The third and last part of the anthology is titled: 'Contexts of Oppression:
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Accountability of Knowing'. It consists of four contributions. The first article by Nancy
Arden McHugh takes up the issue of how to conduct science that is both, epistemically
and morally sound. In 2004, McHugh visited a peace village in Vietnam where victims of
Agent Orange live. Agent Orange is a defoliant containing dioxin that the US used during
the Vietnam war. Whereas international agencies estimate that three million Vietnamese
suffer from severe and life-endangering side effects of Agent Orange, scientific research
conducted in the US denies a causal line between the defoliant and health problems.
McHugh tries to fill the gap between the outcomes of scientific research and the
experiences of the victims by offering the concept of situated methodology. Instead of
relying on clinical trials and laboratory research, science should study the concreteness of
human life at a certain time and place. The situated methodology approach poses
questions like: How long were the members of a particular community exposed to Agent
Orange? How long would Agent Orange exist in this particular ecosystem? Or: What
community practices as, for example, food preparation, child nursing, bathing etc. are
conducive to the exposure to dioxin?
The last three contributions to the anthology focus on the ethical pitfalls of
everyday practices of knowing. Lorraine Code explores the limitations of mutual
understanding that are set within hierarchical relations. Whereas the marginalized is
forced to adopt the stance of a lay anthropologist, the oppressor is unable to understand
why taken-for-granted taxonomies, distinctions and assumptions do not work in the
other's world. Active recognition of alterity, however, is an epistemological prerequisite
for countering inequitable social practices. Code calls for an epistemological pluralism as
well as for humility to overcome being ignorant of one's own ignorance.
Gaile Pohlhaus corroborates the limitation to mutual understanding in hierarchical
relations. Moreover, she argues, asking for understanding from the more powerful
position may be ethically flawed because it may undermine the epistemic and nonepistemic agency of the oppressed. Sometimes, asking persons to understand prevents
them from calling attention to patterns and practices of power relations because the
understanding only makes sense within these very patterns. Public debates about, for
example, race equality incorporates racist details that are actively suppressed and/or
deemed insignificant. Strategic refusals not to understand brings the background
commitments of these debates into focus.
The last article, written by Heidi Grasswick, explores norms of knowledge sharing
and criteria to assess whether these norms are good or harmful according to the goals of
liberatory epistemology. Whereas withholding knowledge often figures in oppressive
practices, also increased knowledge sharing sometimes threatens those in oppressed
positions or prevents particular forms of knowledge from being generated. Grasswick
supports her argument with the case of knowledge sharing expectations from health
insurances, the controversy about governmental wiretapping or the strategy of playing
dumb thus refusing to conform to the dominant group's expectation.
The articles of this anthology all adhere to high standards of argumentation. They
are relevant in raising new questions to feminist and non-feminists epistemology and
philosophy of science and in offering innovative solutions to major problems of the field.
Many of them, especially those related to scientific practices, require background
knowledge of the core concepts of feminist epistemology, such as contextual empiricism,
feminist standpoint theory or situated knowledge. The editor's instructive introduction is
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helpful for a first clarification of these concepts and a good guide for further reading.
Thus, the anthology is suitable even for newcomers to the field provided that they
supplement their reading with some canonical texts.
The order and grouping of articles is a bit confusing. For example, one could have
expected that those articles that deal with the criticism or advancement of scientific
practices (e. g. Rolin, Intemann, and McHugh), would have been allocated under one
heading, whereas for other articles as those of Rooney, Frost or Harding it is hard to see
how they can be grouped at all. This, however, is surely a marginal problem. Besides, a
carefully compiled index helps tracing thematic intersections and references.
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